Abstract. Developing security-critical systems in a way that makes sure that the developed systems actually enforce the desired security requirements is difficult, as can be seen by many security vulnerabilities arising in practice on a regular basis. Part of the difficulty is the transition from the security requirements analysis to the design, which is highly nontrivial and error-prone, leaving the risk of introducing vulnerabilities. Unfortunately, existing approaches bridging this gap largely only provide informal guidelines for the transition from security requirements to secure design. We present a method to systematically develop structural and behavioral UMLsec design models based on security requirements. Each step of our method is supported by model generation rules expressed as pre-and postconditions using the formal specification language OCL. Moreover, we present a concept for a CASE tool based on the model generation rules. Thus, applying our method to generate UMLsec design models supported by this tool and based on previously captured and analyzed security requirements becomes systematic, less error-prone, and a more routine engineering activity. We illustrate our method by the example of a patient monitoring system.
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Introduction
When building secure systems, it is instrumental to take security requirements into account right from the beginning of the development process to reach the best possible match between the expressed requirements and the developed software product, and to eliminate any source of error as early as possible. Knowing that building secure systems is a highly sensitive process, it is important to accomplish the transition from security requirements to secure design correctly, i.e., without introducing vulnerabilities.
In fact, there already exist a number of approaches to security requirements analysis (see [3] for an overview) and secure design (e.g., [10, 9] ). Although this can be considered a positive development, the different approaches are mostly not integrated with each other. In particular, existing approaches on bridging the gap between security requirements analysis and design only provide informal guidelines for the transition from security requirements to design. Carrying out the transition manually according to these guidelines is highly non-trivial and error-prone, which leaves the risk of inadvertently introducing vulnerabilities. Ultimately, this would lead to the security requirements not being enforced in the system design (and later its implementation).
We present a method to systematically develop structural and behavioral design models based on security requirements. We use a security requirement analysis method [6, 13] inspired by Jackson [8] that uses the UML (Unified Modeling Language) 5 profile UML4PF [5] to capture, structure, and analyze security requirements. We extend this approach by a detailed procedure for developing UMLsec [9] design models from previously captured and analyzed security requirements. Our method is supported by model generation rules expressed as pre-and postconditions using the formal specification language OCL (Object Constraint Language) 6 . We present a concept for a CASE tool based on the model generation rules. Since our rules are specified in a formal and analyzable way, the implementation of this tool can be checked automatically for correctness with respect to the model generation rules. Consequently, applying our method to generate UMLsec design models supported by our tool and based on previously captured and analyzed security requirements becomes systematic, less error-prone, and a more routine engineering activity. We illustrate our method by the example of a patient monitoring system.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces our security requirements engineering approach. We give a brief introduction into UMLsec in Sect. 3, which we use in Sect. 4 to systematically develop UMLsec design models based on previously captured and analyzed security requirements. We consider related work in Sect. 5. In Sect. 6, we give a summary and directions for future research.
Environment Description and Security Requirements Analysis
We propose a requirements engineering approach inspired by Jackson [8] . We illustrate this approach using the example of a patient monitoring system, which displays the vital signs of patients to physicians and nurses, and controls an infusion flow according to previously configured rules. In this setting, the display data and the configuration rules are transmitted over an insecure wireless network. We use this case study as a running example throughout this paper. Security requirements can only be guaranteed for a certain context. Therefore, it is important to describe the environment, since software (called machine) is built to improve something in its environment. A context diagram represents the environment in which the machine will operate. Figure 1 shows the context diagram of the PatientMonitoringSystem (PMS) case study in UML notation with stereotypes defined in the UML profile UML4PF [5] . This profile is available online via http://swe.uni-due.de/en/research/tool/. Stereotypes give a specific meaning to the elements of a UML diagram they are attached to, and they are represented by labels surrounded by double angle brackets.
The machine is stereotyped machine , and in our example in Fig. 1 Interfaces connect domains, and they contain shared phenomena. Shared phenomena may be events, operation calls, messages, and the like. They are observable by at least two domains, but controlled by only one domain, as indicated by an exclamation mark. These interfaces are represented as associations, and the name of the associations contain the phenomena and the domain controlling the phenomena. For example, in Fig. 1 the notation HS!{Heartbeat} means that the phenomenon Heartbeat is controlled by the domain HeartbeatSensor.
Developers must elicit, examine, and describe the relevant properties of each domain. These descriptions form the domain knowledge. The domain knowledge consists of assumptions and facts. Assumptions are conditions that are needed, so that the requirements are accomplishable. Usually, they describe required user behavior. For example, it must be assumed that a user ensures not to be observed by a malicious user when entering a password. Facts describe fixed properties of the problem environment, regardless of how the machine is built. is stated, this means that something in the world should be changed by integrating the machine to be developed into it. Therefore, each requirement constrains at least one domain. This is expressed by a dependency from the requirement to a domain with the stereotype constrains . A requirement may refer to several domains in the environment of the machine. For example, security requirements have to refer to an attacker of a certain strength. These references are expressed by a dependency from the requirement to a domain with the stereotype refersTo . The domains referred are also given in the requirements description. Table 1 lists the functional requirements of the PMS case study. Security requirements are associated with functional requirements, which we express using the stereotype complements . For the functional requirements listed in Tab. 1, we initially identified some security requirements, as shown in Tab. 2 in rows 1-3, expressed as proposed in [5] . The required integrity (rows 1 and 2) supports the safety of the system and the required confidentiality (row 3) is necessary for privacy reasons. We decide on generic mechanisms that represent solutions of these requirements. To implement these mechanisms, additional domains have to be introduced, and additional requirements have to be fulfilled. We choose the security mechanism MAC (Message Authentication Code) for integrity and symmetric encryption for confidentiality. For the mechanisms MAC and encryption, a Shared Key known by the Terminal and by the PMS is necessary. As required in Tab. 2 in row 4, this Shared Key must be distributed to the Terminal and to the PMS. The integrity and confidentiality of the Shared Key must be preserved. This will be implemented using a key exchange protocol. For the key exchange, additional secrets (KE keys) are necessary.
The KE keys should be distributed manually as described in Tab. 3 in row 1. Integrity and confidentiality of the Infusion Flow and the PatientMonitoringSystem should be ensured by physical protection (e.g., by reducing electromagnetic field (EMF) radiation and by protection against EMF radiation) and protection by Patient (e.g., Patient prevents physical access to the Infusion Flow) (Tab. 3 in rows 2 and 3). Integrity and confidentiality of the Terminal should be ensured by physical protection (e.g., by reducing electromagnetic field radiation and by protection against EMF radiation) and protection by PhysiciansAndNurses (Tab. 3 in rows 4 and 5).
For reasons of space, we do not depict the UML diagrams equipped with the mentioned stereotypes capturing these security requirements and the security domain knowledge. Instead, we present an overview of the security requirements and the security domain knowledge in Tabs. 2 and 3. These statements are the starting point for developing the design of the machine, which we achieve using UMLsec.
UMLsec
UMLsec constitutes a UML profile to develop and analyze security models. UMLsec offers new UML language elements, i.e., stereotypes, tags, and constraints, to specify typical security requirements such as secrecy, integrity, and authenticity, and attacker models. Examples for pre-defined UMLsec stereotypes are critical to label security-critical parts of UML diagrams, secure dependency to ensure that dependent parts of models preserve the security requirements relevant for the parts they depend on, secure links to introduce attacker models, and data security to analyze behavior models with respect to confidentiality and integrity requirements. The aforementioned stereotypes are used in the next section for creating UMLsec design models based on results from security requirements engineering. A detailed explanation and a formal foundation of the tags and stereotypes defined in UMLsec can be found in [9] .
Based on UMLsec models and the semantics defined for the different UMLsec language elements, possible security vulnerabilities can be identified at a very early stage of software development. One can thus verify that the desired security requirements, if fulfilled, enforce a given security policy. This verification is supported by a tool suite, which is available online via http://www.umlsec.de/.
From Security Requirements to UMLsec Design Models
In this section, we connect the security requirements engineering approach presented in Sect. 2 with secure design based on UMLsec. We first present a procedure to generate UMLsec diagrams describing the environment in Sect. 4.1. Second, we introduce a procedure to generate UMLsec diagrams describing security mechanisms in Sect. 4.2. These procedures are supported by model generation rules, which we express using the formal specification language OCL. More precisely, the model generation rules consist of OCL pre-and postconditions. They can be considered as patterns that describe how existing security measures and cryptographic protocols can be developed based on results from security requirements engineering. We finally present in Sect. 4.3 work in progress on the construction of a tool that realizes the aforementioned procedures to develop UMLsec design models based on security requirements.
UMLsec Deployment Diagrams for Environment Descriptions
According to our security requirements engineering approach as illustrated in Sect. 2, describing the operational environment of a secure software system is of great importance. In fact, the environment description is also necessary for secure design: security-critical design decisions should lead to the fulfillment of the security requirements in the given environment. However, in a different environment, the same design decisions might lead to an insecure system.
In the following, we present a procedure to develop deployment diagrams enriched with UMLsec elements from context diagrams and security requirements. For each step, an operation name with parameters is provided. These operations represent model generation rules. The result of applying this method to the context diagram of the patient monitoring system shown in Fig. 1 is presented in Fig. 2 . This UMLsec deployment diagram can be created following the command sequence depicted in Listing 1.1.
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UMLsec Class and Sequence Diagrams for Security Mechanism Descriptions
In the following, we show how to specify security mechanisms by developing UMLsec diagrams based on security requirements. For each communication path contained in the UMLsec deployment diagram developed as shown in Sect. 4.1 that is not stereotyped wire , we select an appropriate security mechanism according to the results of the problem analysis, e.g., MAC for integrity, symmetric encryption for security, and a protocol for key exchange, see Tab. 2). A security mechanism specification commonly consists of a structural and a behavioral description, which we specify based on the UMLsec data security stereotype. To create security mechanism specifications, we developed a number of model generation rules, for example: Model generation rules can be regarded as patterns for security mechanism specifications. Each of the aforementioned model generation rules describes the construction of a package stereotyped data security containing structural and behavioral descriptions of the mechanism expressed as class and sequence diagrams. Moreover, the package contains a UMLsec deployment diagram developed as shown in Sect. 4.1.
We explain in detail the model generation rule createKeyExchangeProtocol(initiatorNodeName: String, responderNodeName: String, newPackage: String) shown in Listing 1.3. We use this protocol to realize the security requirement given in Table 2 , row 4, of the patient monitoring system. We use the protocol that secures data transmissions using MACs for the security requirements in rows 1 and 2, and we use the protocol for symmetrically encrypted data transmissions for the security requirement in row 3.
The precondition of the model generation rule for key exchange protocols states that nodes named initiatorNodeName and responderNodeName exist (lines 2-3 in Listing 1.3). The communication path between these nodes (line 8) should have the stereotype encrypted , Internet , or LAN (lines 9-10). Additionally, a package named newPackage must not exist (line 11). If these conditions are fulfilled, then the postcondition can be guaranteed. The first part of the postcondition describes the construction of a class diagram, and the second part specifies the construction of a sequence diagram. The following class diagram elements are created as shown in the example in Fig. 3: 1 c r e a t e K e y E x c h a n g e P r o t o c o l ( i n i t i a t o r N o d e N a m e : S t r i n g , responderNodeName :
S t r i n g , newPackage : S t r i n g ) ; 2 PRE Node . a l l I n s t a n c e s ( ) −>s e l e c t ( name=i n i t i a t o r N o d e N a m e ) −>s i z e ( ) =1 and 3
Node . a l l I n s t a n c e s ( ) −>s e l e c t ( name=responderNodeName ) −>s i z e ( ) =1 and 4 l e t c p t y p e s : Bag ( S t r i n g ) = 5
CommunicationPath . a l l I n s t a n c e s ( )−>s e l e c t ( cp |   6 cp . endType−>i n c l u d e s ( Node . a l l I n s t a n c e s ( ) −>s e l e c t ( name=i n i t i a t o r N o d e N a m e )−>a s S e q u e n c e ( )−> f i r s t ( ) ) and 7 cp . endType−>i n c l u d e s ( Node . a l l I n s t a n c e s ( ) −>s e l e c t ( name=responderNodeName )−>a s S e q u e n c e ( )−> f i r s t ( ) )
Package . a l l I n s t a n c e s ( ) −>s e l e c t ( name=newPackage ) −>s i z e ( ) =0 12 13 POST Package . a l l I n s t a n c e s ( ) −>s e l e c t ( name=newPackage ) −>s i z e ( ) =1 and 14 −− . . . S t e r e o t y p e w i t h a t t r i b u t e s e x i s t s 15 C l a s s . a l l I n s t a n c e s ( ) −>s e l e c t ( name=i n i t i a t o r N o d e N a m e ) −>s e l e c t ( o c l I s T y p e O f ( C l a s s ) ) −>s i z e ( ) =1 and 16 C l a s s . a l l I n s t a n c e s ( ) −>s e l e c t ( name=responderNodeName ) −>s e l e c t ( o c l I s T y p e O f ( C l a s s ) ) −>s i z e ( ) =1 and
C l a s s . a l l I n s t a n c e s ( ) −>s e l e c t ( name=i n i t i a t o r N o d e N a m e ) −>s e l e c t ( o c l I s T y p e O f ( C l a s s ) ) . o w n e d A t t r i b u t e 19
−>s e l e c t ( name=' i n v ( K T ) ' ) . t y p e −>s e l e c t ( name = ' Keys ' ) −> s i z e ( ) = 1 and 20 −− . . . o t h e r a t t r i b u t e s e x i s t . . .
C l a s s . a l l I n s t a n c e s ( ) −>s e l e c t ( name=i n i t i a t o r N o d e N a m e ) −>s e l e c t ( o c l I s T y p e O f ( C l a s s ) ) . o w n e d O p e r a t i o n 22
−>s e l e c t ( name=' r e s p ' ) Figure 3 shows the class diagram and Fig. 4 the sequence diagram developed for the patient monitoring system according to this model generation rule. They are created with createKeyExchangeProtocol('Terminal', 'PatientMonitoringSystem', 'KeyExchProt'). In the created model, the tag {secrecy} of the critical class Terminal contains the secret s , which represents an array of secrets to be exchanged in different rounds of this protocol. It also contains the private key inv(K T) of the Terminal. Next to these assets, the {integrity} tag additionally contains the nonces N used for the protocol, the public key K T of the Terminal, the public key K CA of the certification authority, and the round iterator i. These tag values are reasonable because the security domain knowledge in Tab. 3, rows 2 and 3 states that the PatientMonitoringSystem with its contained data is kept confidential and its integrity is preserved. The tag {authenticity} expresses that the PatientMonitoringSystem P i is authenticated with respect to the Terminal. This is ensured by the domain knowledge in Tab If the guard at the lifeline of the Terminal is true, i.e., the certificate is actually for S and the correct nonce is returned, then the Terminal sends xchd(. . . ) to the PatientMonitoringSystem. If the protocol is executed successfully, i.e., the two guards are evaluated to true, then both parties share the secret s i.
The key exchange protocol only fulfills the corresponding security requirements if integrity, confidentiality, and authenticity of the keys are ensured. According to our pattern system for security requirements engineering [5] , applying the key exchange mechanism leads to dependent statements about integrity, confidentiality, and authenticity of the keys as stated in Tab. 3.
Tool Design
We are currently constructing a graphical wizard-based tool that supports a software engineer in interactively generating UMLsec design models. The tool will implement the model generation rules presented in the previous subsections to generate UMLsec deployment, class, and sequence diagrams. A graphical user interface allows users to choose the parameters, and it ensures that these parameters fulfill the preconditions. For example, users can choose the value of the second parameter of the model generation rule setCommunicationPathType(inDiagram: String, assName: String, type: String) based on the return values of the rule getNetworkConnections(). Our tool will automatically construct the corresponding parts of the UMLsec model as described in the postcondition. Since our model generation rules are specified with OCL in a formal and analyzable way, our tool implementation can be checked automatically for correctness with respect to our specification based on an appropriate API such as the Eclipse implementation for EMF-based models 7 . In addition to realizing the OCL specification, the tool will support workflows adequate to generate the desired UMLsec models, e.g., as depicted in Listing 1.1.
In summary, we presented in this section a novel integrated and formal approach connecting security requirements analysis and secure design.
Related Work
The approach presented in this paper can be compared on the one hand-side to other work bridging the gap between security requirements engineering secure design, and on the other hand-side to work on transforming UML models based on rules expressed in OCL.
Relatively little work has been done on the first category of related work, i.e., bridging the gap between security requirements analysis and design. Recently, an approach [12] to connect the security requirements analysis method Secure Tropos by Mouratidis et al. [4] and UMLsec [9] is published. A further approach [7] connects UMLsec with security requirements analysis based on heuristics. In contrast to our work, these approaches only provide informal guidelines for the transition from security requirements to design. Consequently, they do not allow to verify the correctness of this transition step.
The second category of related work considers the transformation of UML models based on OCL transformation contracts [1, 11] . We basically use parts of this work, e.g., the specification of transformation operations using OCL pre-and postconditions. Additionally, our model generation rules can be seen as patterns, since they describe the generation of completely new model elements according to generic security mechanisms, e.g., cryptographic keys.
Conclusions and Future Work
We presented in this paper a novel method to bridge the gap between security requirements analysis and secure design. We complemented our method by formal model generation rules expressed in OCL. Thus, the construction of UMLsec design models based on results from security requirements engineering becomes more feasible, systematic, less error-prone, and a more routine engineering activity. We illustrated our approach using the sample development of a patient monitoring system.
In the future, we would like to elaborate more on the connection between the presented security requirements engineering approach and UMLsec. For example, we intend to develop a notion of correctness for the step from security requirements engineering to secure design based on the approach presented in this paper.
